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Entanglement is of paramount importance in quantum information theory. Its supremacy over
classical correlations has been demonstrated in a numerous information theoretic protocols. Here we
study possible adequacy of quantum entanglement in Bayesian game theory, particularly in social
welfare solution (SWS), a strategy which the players follow to maximize sum of their payoffs. Given a
multi-partite quantum state as an advice, players can come up with several correlated strategies by
performing local measurements on their parts of the quantum state. A quantum strategy is called
quantum-SWS if it is advantageous over a classical equilibrium (CE) strategy in the sense that none
of the players has to sacrifice their CE-payoff rather some have incentive and at the same time it
maximizes sum of all players’ payoffs over all possible quantum advantageous strategies. Quantum
state yielding such a quantum-SWS is called a quantum social welfare advice (SWA). We show that
any two-qubit pure entangled states, even if it is arbitrarily close to a product state, can serve as
quantum-SWA in some Bayesian game. Our result, thus, gives cognizance to the fact that every
two-qubit pure entanglement is the best resource for some operational task.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is the study of human conflict and co-
operation within a competitive situation. It has been
widely used in various social and behavioral sciences,
e.g., economics [1], political sciences [2], biological phe-
nomena [3], as well as logic, computer science, and psy-
chology [4]. More formally, it is a mathematical study
of strategic decision making among interacting decision
makers. Each decision maker is considered as a player
with a set of possible actions and each one has preference
over certain actions. Such preference can be modeled
mathematically by associating some payoff with each
of the action. First systematic study of preferences over
different possible actions was discussed by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern [5]. Then J. Nash introduced the
seminal concept– the concept of Nash equilibrium [6, 7].
He also proved that for any game, with finite number
of actions for each player, there will always be a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium. Later, Harsanyi introduced
the notion of Bayesian games where each player have
some private information unknown to other players [8–
10]. In such a Bayesian scenario Aumann proved that
the proper notion of equilibrium is not the ordinary
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium but a more general –
correlated equilibrium [11]. A correlated equilibrium can
be achieved by some correlated strategy where correla-
tion is given to the players as common advice by some
referee. Later it has been further established that psy-
chology of the participating players is also an important
component in the study of game theory [12]. Psycholo-
gical evidence shows that rather than pursuing solely
their own payoffs, players may also consider additional
social goals. Such social behavior of the players may
result different types of ‘fairness equilibrium’ solution.
One such concept is social welfare solution (SWS) where
the players try to maximize sum of their payoffs [13].
In this work, we study this particular notion of SWS,
but in the quantum realm. In the quantum scenario
the referee, instead of a classical correlation, provides
a multi-partite quantum system to the players as com-
mon advice. The players can come up with correlations
generated from the quantum advice by performing local
measurements on their respective parts of quantum sys-
tem and consequently can follow a correlated strategy.
Such a quantum strategy is advantageous over a clas-
sical equilibrium (CE) strategy if none of the players’
payoff is lower than the corresponding CE-payoff, rather
some players have incentive over the CE-payoff. Among
different advantageous quantum strategies those max-
imizing the sum of all players’ payoffs will be called
quantum-SWS. Furthermore, a quantum state giving
rise to such a strategy is called quantum social welfare
advices (quantum-SWA). In this work we show that any
two-qubit pure entangled state, however less entangle-
ment it may have, can produce quantum-SWS for some
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2Bayesian game. In other words, all such entangled states
can act as useful resource for some game. We estab-
lish this claim by constructing a family of two-player
Bayesian games. Rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Sec. [II] we briefly review the framework of
game theory. In Sec. [III] we discuss some important
notions regarding the use of quantum correlations as
advice in games. Our main results are presented in Sec.
[IV], and in Sec. [V] we present a brief discussion.
II. PRELIMINARIES OF GAME THEORY
Game theory starts with a very basis assumption that
the players are rational, i.e., they will choose the best
actions to get highest available payoffs 1. We denote a
game by the symbol G and for simplicity we restrict
the discussion to two-player games played between
(say) Alice and Bob (extension to higher number of
players is straightforward and interested readers may
see the classic book by Osborne [4]). We denote the
type of ith player by ti ∈ Ti and denote her/his action
by si ∈ Si, for i ∈ {A, B}, calligraphic fonts denot-
ing the type and action profiles. A type can represent
many things: it can be a characteristic of the player or
a secret objective of the player, which remain private
to the players in Bayesian scenario. There may be a
prior probability distribution P(T ) over the type pro-
file T := TA × TB. Each player is assigned a payoff
over the type and action profile, i.e., vi : T × S 7→ R,
where S := SA × SB. In the absence of any correlation
or external advice, players can apply strategies that are
either pure or mixed. For the ith player, a pure strategy
is a map gi : Ti 7→ Si, meaning that the player selects
a deterministic action based only on her/his type. A
mixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure
ones, i.e. the function gi : Ti 7→ Si becomes a random
function described by a conditional probability distribu-
tion on Si given the type ti ∈ Ti and we will denote such
mixed strategies as gi(si|ti) (for a more detailed discus-
sion see [16]). The average payoff for the ith player is
given by, 〈vi(g)〉 := ∑t,s P(t)vi(t, s)gA(sA|tA)gB(sB|tB).
Here g ≡ (gA, gB) ∈ G = GA × GB, with Gi denoting
the strategy profile for the ith party, s ≡ (sA, sB) ∈ S ,
and t ≡ (tA, tB) ∈ T ; and P(t) denotes the probabil-
ity according to which the types are sampled. A solu-
tion for a game is a family of strategies g ≡ (gA, gB),
each for Alice and Bob respectively. A solution g∗ is a
Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to change
the adopted strategy, i.e., 〈vi(g∗)〉 ≥ 〈vi(gi, g∗rest)〉, for
1 Note that situation where players have bounded rationality is also
studied in game theory [14, 15]. However, in this work we will
consider only rational players.
i ∈ {A, B}, where 〈vi(gi, g∗rest)〉 denote the average pay-
off of ith player when all the players, but ith player, follow
the strategy profile from g∗ and ith player follow some
other strategy.
Achievability of Nash equilibrium is another import-
ant question. As pointed out by Aumann it can be
achieved only when each of the players know other
players’ strategy exactly. So, he proposed a more
general notion of equilibrium – correlated Nash equi-
librium [17]. While in a mixed strategy players can
choose pure strategies with probability P(gA, gB) =
P(gA)P(gB), with P(gi) denoting the probability dis-
tribution over the ith player’s pure strategy, Aumann
pointed out that some adviser can provide a more gen-
eral probability distribution (advice) which not neces-
sarily is in the product form. A correlated strategy is
defined as the map g(λ) chosen with some probabil-
ity λ from the probability space Λ over G = GA × GB.
The referee chooses an element λ from Λ and sug-
gests to each player i to follow the strategy gi(λ).
With such an advice from the referee, the average
payoff for the ith player is denoted as, 〈vi(g(λ))〉 :=
∑t,s,λ P(t)P(λ)vi(t, s)gA(sA|tA,λ)gB(sB|tB,λ).
A correlated strategy g∗ chosen with some advice
λ ∈ Λ is called a correlated Nash equilibrium if no
player has an incentive while deviating from the adop-
ted strategy. Note that, every pure/mixed Nash equilib-
rium is also a correlated equilibrium, however the set
of correlation equilibria is strictly larger that the set of
mixed strategy Nash equilibria (see Appendix-A). It has
also been shown that correlated equilibria are easier to
compute [18].
III. QUANTUM CORRELATIONS AS ADVICE
In quantum scenario, the referee, instead of some clas-
sical correlation, provides a bi-partite quantum state
ρAB ∈ D(CdA ⊗ CdB) as advice; D(CdAA ⊗ CdBB ) denotes
the set of hermitian, positive, and trace-1 operators
(i.e. density operator) acting on the composite Hil-
bert space CdAA ⊗ CdBB . The players perform positive-
operator-valued-measurements (POVM) {Exioi | Exioi ≥
0 ∀ oi, xi, ∑oi E
xi
oi = 1i ∀ xi, i ∈ {A, B}}, with 1i being
the identity operator on Cdii , and generate an input-
output probability distribution P(OA,OB|XA,XB) ≡
{P(oA, oB|xA, xB) | oi ∈ Oi, xi ∈ Xi} in accordance
with the Born rule, i.e., P(oA, oB|xA, xB) = Tr[ρAB(ExBoB ⊗
ExBoB )]. The players follow some randomized strategy ac-
cording to this probability distribution. Thus a quantum
strategy is specified by the triplet
(
ρAB, {ExAoA }, {ExBoB }
)
.
Note that, to demonstrate an advantage over the clas-
sical correlated strategies the correlation generated from
a quantum strategy need to be stronger than classical
(or in other word local realistic (LR)) correlations ΛLR
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Table I. (Color online) Utility table for the game G(ζ, η) with ζ ∈ [0, 2) and η > 0. Depending on the parameters ζ, η, the colored
cells denotes different equilibria. When 1/(2− ζ) < η < 1/ζ, there are two conflicting equilibrium strategies for the type
(tA = 0, tB = 0), that are (sA = 0, sB = 0) and (sA = 0, sB = 0) (blue cells). For η > 1/2 also, there are two conflicting strategies,
i.e., (sA = 0, sB = 0) and (sA = 0, sB = 0) (yellow cells) for the type (tA = 1, tB = 0).
(see Appendix B). If the given quantum advice ρAB is an
entangled state [19, 20] then it may provide correlations
which are not local-realistic, and such correlations are
commonly known as nonlocal correlations [21–23]. In
Bayesian game theoretic scenario usefulness of such non-
local correlations over the classical correlated strategies
has been demonstrated in various recent results [24–26].
From the aforesaid discussion it is evident that to
achieve a better quantum strategy (than the optimal
classical strategies) the players must share entangled
quantum state. More precisely, an entangled quantum
advice ρentAB will be called advantageous over a clas-
sical equilibrium strategy g∗ if the players can come
up with a quantum strategy
(
ρentAB, {ExAoA }, {ExBoB }
)
such
that 〈vi(ρentAB)〉 ≥ 〈vi(g∗)〉, ∀ i, and strict inequality holds
for some (at least one) i; 〈vi(ρentAB)〉 denotes the payoff
for the ith player while following the quantum strategy(
ρentAB, {ExAoA }, {ExBoB }
)
.
Definition 1 Given a quantum advice ρentAB, a strategy(
ρentAB, {ExAoA }∗, {ExBoB }∗
)
is optimal if no player has an in-
centive while deviating from the adopted strategy.
The following definition will be useful to compare
among different quantum advices.
Definition 2 A quantum advice ρ∗entAB is called the optimal
advice if there is a strategy
(
ρ∗entAB , {ExAoA }∗, {ExBoB }∗
)
such
that no player has an incentive while deviating from the ad-
opted strategy even with some other quantum advice. Such a
strategy is called quantum equilibrium strategy.
The authors in [25] have studied quantum equilibrium
strategy in a conflicting Bayesian game. However, the
equilibrium studied there is a fair one where play-
ers have equal payoffs. The notion of classical un-
fair equilibrium where different players have different
payoffs, is well defined. But as noted in [26], such a
notion in quantum scenario is not pertinent, in gen-
eral. This is because, given a quantum advice ρentAB,
there may exist more than one quantum strategies, say(
ρentAB, {ExAoA }1
st
, {ExBoB }1
st)
and
(
ρentAB, {ExAoA }2
nd
, {ExBoB }2
nd)
,
such that both are advantageous over the classical
strategy g∗ but Alice gets optimal payoff for 1st strategy
while Bob’s payoff is optimal for 2nd one and hence res-
ults to a conflict between the players in choosing their
strategies for the given advice. In such a scenario, a rel-
evant figure of merit for the unfair quantum strategies
is social optimality solution or social welfare solution
(SWS). The expected social welfare SW(g) of a classical
solution g is the sum of the expected payoffs of all the
players, i.e., SW(g) = ∑i〈vi(g)〉 [13]. Importantly, this
particular notion is also relevant in social choice theory
[27, 28].
Definition 3 Consider an classical unfair equilibrium solu-
tion g∗, with payoffs 〈vA(g∗)〉 6= 〈vB(g∗)〉. Among the dif-
ferent quantum advantageous strategies over g∗, a quantum
strategy will be called quantum-SWS if it maximizes the
sum of the payoffs. The corresponding quantum entangled
state ρent−swAB producing the quantum-SWS is called quantum-
social welfare advice (SWA).
To say mathematically, ρSWAAB is a quantum-SWA if there
exists some quantum strategy such that, 〈vi(ρSWAAB )〉 ≥〈vi(g∗)〉, ∀ i (with strict inequality for some i), and
the strategy maximize ∑i〈vi(ρSWAAB )〉. In the following
we will establish that all the two-qubit pure entangled
states are quantum-SWA in some Bayesian game.
IV. RESULT
Consider a game G(ζ, η) played between two rational
players, Alice and Bob. Each of the players has two types,
i.e., ti ∈ Ti ≡ {0, 1} and two actions si ∈ Si ≡ {0, 1};
i ∈ {A, B}. The payoffs assigned to the players depend
on the respective types and actions. An utility table for
the game G(ζ, η) is given in Table-I.
From Table-I one can see that following are the only
possible pure Nash equilibrium strategies:
(i) Type (tA = 0, tB = 0): in this case (sA =
0, sB = 0) is an equilibrium strategy with pay-
off ((ηζ + 1)/4, (ηζ − 1)/4), and whenever η >
41/(2 − ζ) the strategy (sA = 1, sB = 1) is also
an equilibrium with payoff (0, 0). Furthermore,
if the values of the parameter ζ and η be such
that 1/(2 − ζ) < η < 1/ζ, then there is con-
flict between Alice’s and Bob’s preferences: Alice
prefers the strategy (sA = 0, sB = 0) while Bob
prefers (sA = 1, sB = 1).
(ii) Type (tA = 0, tB = 1): here (sA = 0, sB = 0) and
(sA = 1, sB = 1) are two equilibria with payoffs
((2η + 3)/4, 3η/4) and (3/4, η/4), respectively.
(iii) Type (tA = 1, tB = 0): in this case (sA = 0, sB = 0)
is an equilibrium with payoff (−1/4, 1/4), and
whenever η > 1/2 there is another equilibrium,
that is (sA = 1, sB = 1) with payoff (0, 0). Here
also the equilibrium strategies are conflicting
(iv) Type (tA = 1, tB = 1): in this case there are three
equilibria (sA = 0, sB = 1), (sA = 1, sB = 0) and
(sA = 1, sB = 1) each of them having the payoff
(η/4, 9/4).
Consider that the types of the players are private, i.e., un-
known to other player and hence the game is Bayesian in
nature. Each player can choose the following four pure
strategies: g1i (ti) = 0, g
2
i (ti) = 1, g
3
i (ti) = ti, g
4
i (ti) =
ti ⊕ 1. Here g1i (ti) = 0 means that ith player follows the
action si = 0 whatever her/his type ti be, and other gi’s
are defined analogously where ⊕ denotes addition mod-
ulo 2 operation. Altogether the players have 16 different
pure strategies (glA, g
m
B ), with l,m = 1, 2, 3, 4. Straightfor-
ward calculation gives the average payoffs for these 16
pure strategies and it turns out that classical equilibrium
strategies have payoffs 〈vA(g∗)〉 = (3+ η + ηζ)/16 and
〈vB(g∗)〉 = (9+ η+ ηζ)/16, respectively (see Appendix
C).
To establish our result, i.e, superlative behavior of all
2-qubit pure entangled states in the above described
games, first we consider the set of most general 2-
party–2-input–2-output no-signaling (NS) correlations
that constitutes a polytope, say PNS. The correla-
tions resided in PNS have been extensively studied
[29–33]. Any such correlation P(OA,OB|XA,XB) ≡
{P(oA, oB|xA, xB)} ∈ PNS, with oi ∈ Oi ≡ {+1,−1}
and xi ∈ Xi ≡ {0, 1} can be represented in a canonical
form where (P(++ |00), P(+− |00), P(−+ |00), P(−−
|00)) ≡ (c00,m0 − c00, n0 − c00, 1− m0 − n0 + c00) and
the rests can be defined analogously (see Appendix B).
When advised by such a correlation P ∈ PNS, Alice’s
and Bob’s payoffs read as:
〈vi(P)〉 = 116
[
3κ +
η
2
(BCHSH + 2ζm0)
−(−1)κ(m0 − n0)] , (1)
with κ = 1 (κ = 2) for i = A (i = B). Here,
BCHSH denotes the Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
(Bell-CHSH) expression, BCHSH := ∑1k,j=0(−1)kj
〈〈xA =
k, xB = j〉
〉
= 4
(
∑1k,j=0(−1)kjckj −m0 − n0 + 1/2
)
,
where
〈〈xA, xB〉〉 := ∑−1oA ,oB=+1 oAoBP(oA, oB|xA, xB).
Correlations that are obtainable from quantum strategies
form a convex set, say Q, which is a strict subset of
the polytope PNS. As discussed earlier, a quantum
strategy
(
ρentAB, {ExAoA }, {ExBoB }
)
will be a quantum social
welfare solution for the game G(ζ, η), if 〈vA(P)〉 ≥
〈vA(g∗)〉 = (3+ η + ηζ)/16 and 〈vB(P)〉 ≥ 〈vB(g∗)〉 =
(9+ η + ηζ)/16 (with at least one the inequalities strict)
and 〈vA(P)〉+ 〈vB(P)〉 takes the maximum value over
the set of quantum correlations. Using the expression
from Eq.(1), we have,
〈vA(P)〉+ 〈vB(P)〉 = 116 [12+ η (BCHSH + 2ζm0)] . (2)
Note that, the factor within the round brackets on
the right hand side of the Eq.(2), i.e., the expression
BCHSH + 2ζm0, is actually the expression of tilted-
CHSH operator studied in Ref.[34]. It has been shown
in [35, 36] that within Q the tilted-CHSH operator
takes maximum value by a probability distribution
P(OA,OB|XA,XB) ∈ Q obtained form the quantum
state |ψ〉AB = cos θ|00〉AB + sin θ|11〉AB with the local
projective measurement E(xA=0) = σz, E(xA=1) = σx and
E(xB=0) = cos βσz + sin βσx, E(xB=1) = cos βσz − sin βσx;
where tan β = sin 2θ and ζ = 2/
√
1+ 2 tan2 2θ ∈ [0, 2).
The same choice of state and measurements also max-
imize the right hand side of Eq.(2). This is because, if
B := ∑oA ,oB ,xA ,xB CoAoBxAxBP(oA, oB|xA, xB) ≤ BL is an
arbitrary Bell operator with BL being the local bound,
then the Bell operator FK1,K2(B) := K1B + K2, with
K1 ∈ R+ and K2 ∈ R, has the local realistic bound
FK1,K2(BL). Moreover the points on the boundary
of the set of quantum correlations that achieve the
quantum maximum for B and FK1,K2(B) are going
to be the same. This fact also ensures that for the
games where ith player’s average payoff is of the form
〈vi(P〉) = FKi1,Ki2(B), with some Bell operator B but dif-
ferent Kij’s for different players’, the concept of unfair
equilibrium fits even in the quantum regime. How-
ever this is not the case always with the game G(ζ, η)
considered in this work, and for this game the above
mentioned optimal tilted-CHSH yields,
〈vi(P)〉 = 116
[
3κ +
η
2
3− cos 4θ√
1+ sin2 2θ
+
2η cos2 θ√
1+ 2 tan2 2θ
−(−1)κ 1
2
cos 2θ
(
1− 1√
1+ sin2 2θ
)]
.(3)
As already discussed, a quantum strategy will be ad-
vantageous when the players have incentive over the clas-
sical equilibrium payoff, i.e., δVi := 〈vi(P)〉 − 〈vi(g∗)〉 ≥
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Figure 1. (Color online) δVi vs θ plot. Solid curves are for
η = 16, while dashed are for η = 256. Red for δVA and blue
for δVB. For eta = 16, δVB is positive if θ is greater than ≈ 0.12
and for η = 256 it is positive if θ is greater than ≈ 0.03 (shown
in the inset). δVA is positive always.
0 for i ∈ {A, B}, with strict inequality holding for at
least one case. Taking the value of η = 16, we find that
δVA > 0 for the full range of the parameter θ ∈ (0,pi/4],
however δVB remain positive if θ is not too small, if θ
takes value greater than ≈ 0.12 (see Fig.1). Therefore
the quantum states |ψAB〉 = cos θ|00〉 + sin θ|11〉 cor-
responding to the said range of θ act as the quantum
social welfare advice for the game G(ζ, η = 16), where
ζ = 2/
√
1+ 2 tan2 θ. If we increase the value of η then
δVA remains always positive and δVB becomes positive
for even smaller values of θ (see Fig.1). Moreover, taking
arbitrarily large value for η one can make θ arbitrarily
close to zero and can have quantum advantage (see Ap-
pendix C). It is also noteworthy that with increasing
values for η the quantum advantage over classical payoff
also increases. Therefore even when the given quantum
entangled state is arbitrarily close to a product state still
it suffices to be a quantum-SWA.
V. DISCUSSIONS
Study of entanglement, its quantification, classifica-
tions as well as its applications in different information
theoretic protocols [37–40], is one of the core research
topics of quantum information theory. Quantum entan-
glement also draws research attention from a found-
ational perspective since it lies at the core of some
of the most puzzling features of quantum mechan-
ics: the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen argument [41], the
Schrödinger’s steering concept [42–44], and most im-
portantly the nonlocal behavior of quantum mechan-
ics [21–23]. Here, we have studied an application of
this quantum information theoretic resource in another
vastly important area of research, Bayesian game the-
ory. Our result establishes all two-qubit pure entangled
states as the ’gold coin’ in a certain Bayesian game
theoretic scenario. From our analysis it is evident
that the nonlocal behavior of the correlations obtained
from those entangled states plays the key role in the
Bayesian scenario we have considered. This observa-
tion leads us to make some interesting comments based
on some already known facts. In [45], the authors have
shown that in the N-party–2-input–2-output scenario the
quantum maximum of any linear Bell type expression,
β := ∑oi ,xi ,i∈{1,..,N} Co1,x1,...,oN ,xNP(o1, ..., oN |x1, ..., xN), is
achievable by measuring N-qubit pure states with
projective observables. Therefore quantum strategies
formed from these states and observables have the po-
tential to be quantum-SWS for suitably chosen N-player
Bayesian game where each player is given two types and
two actions and where sum of the payoffs of the players
turns out to be FK1,K2(β). However, explicit construction
of such games require extensive effort and promises to
be an interesting topic for future research. Also note
that the quantum-SWS studied in the 2− 2− 2 scenario
lie on the nonlocal boundary of the quantum set Q. We
leave the converse of the statement as a conjecture. We
make the conjecture in a broader sense that any non-
local boundary point of the set Q for general N−M−K
scenario is a quantum-SWS for some Bayesian game.
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Appendix A: Nash equilibrium
To illustrate the idea of uncorrelated and correlated
Nash equilibrium, here we discuss two examples.
Example-1: Our first example is the famous two-
party game called ’battle of sexes’ (BoS) where the
pay-offs of the players are given as in the Table-II. The
Nash equilibria are the action profile (same as strategy
profile, since the players do not have multiple types)
6Table II. (Color Online) Utility table for the game of battle of
sexes. Colored cells (sA = sB) are the two pure strategy Nash
equilibria.
sB = 0 sB = 1
sA = 0 (2, 1) (0, 0)
sA = 1 (0, 0) (1, 2)
Table III. (Color Online) Utility table for the game of chicken.
Colored cells (sA 6= sB) are the two pure strategy Nash equi-
libria.
sB = 0 sB = 1
sA = 0 (6, 6) (2, 7)
sA = 1 (7, 2) (0, 0)
(sA = 0, sB = 0) with pay-offs (2, 1) and the action pro-
file (sA = 1, sB = 1) with pay-offs (1, 2). Now in a
practical scenario, Alice and Bob can follow an equilib-
rium strategy if each of them deterministically know the
action of other party. But if the players have ignorance
about others’ strategy then the achievability of equilib-
rium strategies are in question. In such case, a referee
can advice them to reach their goal. Let the referee
tosses a coin and announces the outcome (head/tail)
to both Alice and Bob. Upon receiving the outcome
head (tail) each party follow the strategy si = 0 (si = 1)
and accordingly follow one of the equilibrium strategies.
This example establishes clear practical usefulness of
the idea of correlated equilibrium over the uncorrelated
ones.
Example-2: To point out more drastic difference
between uncorrelated and correlated Nash equilibrium,
let us consider another game known as the ’game of
chickens’, specified by the pay-off Table-III. Here the
Nash equilibria (uncorrelated) are (sA = 0, sB = 1)
with pay-offs (2, 7) and (sA = 1, sB = 0) with pay-offs
(7, 2). Also in this game there exists a uncorrelated
mixed equilibrium strategy. If each player chooses the
strategies si = 0 and si = 1 with probability 2/3 and
1/3, respectively then they have the equilibrium pay-off
(14/3, 14/3). To see this, suppose player A (B) assigns
probability p (q) to their respective pure action 0. The
expected payoff for A (B) to sA = 0 (sB = 0) and sA = 1
(sB = 1) are respectively 4q + 2 (4p + 2) and 7q (7p).
From the definition of mixed strategy equilibrium it is
evident that it will be attained when each will yield the
same expected payoff for both si = 0 and si = 1 for
i = A, B. This restricts both p and q to be 2/3 to attain
the expected payoff (14/3, 14/3) for the mixed strategy
equilibrium.
However like in the BoS game here also a referee
can help the player to follow some particular correlated
strategy. If the referee provides the players a correlation
advice according to which they choose any one of pure
strategies (sA = 0, sB = 0), (sA = 0, sB = 1), and (sA =
1, sB = 0) randomly, then the average pay-off will be
(5, 5) which is a correlated Nash equilibrium.
Note that, this correlated equilibrium can not be
reached by convex mixing of the uncorrelated Nash
equilibria. Clearly this shows that the notion of cor-
related equilibrium is more general than the original
notion of equilibrium as introduced by Nash– correlated
equilibrium can be in the outside of convex hull formed
by the (uncorrelated) Nash equilibrium strategies. But it
is important to point out that every Nash equilibrium
is a correlated equilibrium though the converse is not
true. Another fundamental aspect of game theory is
the degree of complexity of finding the equilibria. It
was shown that correlated equilibrium are easier to be
computed [18].
Appendix B: Correlations (as Advice)– Local vs Nonlocal
Correlation obtained from the referee as advice helps
the players to achieve the correlated equilibrium strategy.
Based on different restrictions on the shared correlations,
various notions of equilibrium can be defined, such as
shared randomness equilibrium, no-signaling correla-
tion equilibrium etc [16]. On the other hand, study of
correlations, in particular local vs nonlocal as inspired
by the seminal result of Bell [21, 22], is one of the fun-
damental aspect of quantum foundations [23]. Very
recently, Brunner and Linden have explored the connec-
tion between Bell nonlocality and Bayesian game theory
[24]. In a Bayesian game each player may have some
private information unknown to other players; on the
other hand, the players may have a common piece of
advice and thus can follow correlated strategies. As poin-
ted out by Brunner and Linden, the concept of private
information in Bayesian games is analogous to the no-
tion of locality in Bell inequalities (BIs), and the fact that
common advice in Bayesian games does not reveal the
private information mimics the concept of no-signaling
resources in case of BIs.
Correlations among spatially separated parties are rel-
evant for our purpose. Any such correlations can be
represented as input-output conditional probability dis-
tribution. Here, for our purpose, we restrict ourselves
into two parties, Alice and Bob. Denoting the inputs of
Alice and Bob by xA ∈ XA and xB ∈ XB and their out-
comes by oA ∈ OA and oB ∈ OB, the input-output prob-
ability can be represented as a conditional probability
P(OA,OB|XA,XB) := {P(oAoB|xAxB) | oA ∈ OA, oB ∈
OB, xA ∈ XA, xB ∈ XB} which must satisfy,
positivity: P(oA, oB|xA, xB) ≥ 0, ∀ oA, oB, xA, xB,
and
7normalization:
∑
oA ,oB
P(oA, oB|xA, xB) = 1 ∀ xA, xB.
Correlations compatible with the principle of ‘relativistic
causality’ principle or more generally ‘no signaling’(NS)
principle which prevents instantaneous communication
between two space-like separated locations need to sat-
isfy further constraints:
P(oB|xA, xB) :=∑
oA
P(oA, oB|xA, xB) = P(oB|xB),
∀oB, xA, xB; (B1)
P(oA|xA, xB) :=∑
oB
P(oA, oB|xA, xB) = P(oA|xA),
∀oA, xA, xB. (B2)
Any such physical correlations obtained in classical
world satisfy two further conditions called locality and
reality (LR) and are of the following form [23]:
P(oA, oB|xA, xB) =
∫
ρ(λLR)P(oA|xA,λ)P(oB|xB,λ)dλ,
(B3)
where λ ∈ Λ is some common shared variable sampled
according to the probability distribution ρ(λ). Correl-
ations of the form of Eq.(B3) are also compatible with
Reichenbach’s principle according to which if two phys-
ical variables are found to be statistically dependent,
then there should be a causal explanation of this fact 2
[46, 47]. However, in 1966, in the seminal paper J.S. Bell
came up with an inequality [21, 22] which is satisfied by
any local-realistic correlation of Eq.(B3). Interestingly, in
his paper Bell also pointed out that in quantum world
correlations can arise among the outcomes of measure-
ments performed on the entangled states of space like
separated particles that violate his inequality and such
are called nonlocal.
2-party–2-input–2-output NS correlations
Here we consider a more specific scenario with two
inputs for each party with two outputs for each of the
input, i.e., oi ∈ Oi = {0, 1} and xi ∈ Xi = {0, 1} for
i ∈ {A, B}. We also consider that Ti = Xi and Oi = Si,
that is ith player’s types and actions correspond, respect-
ively, to the inputs and outputs of the NS correlation.
The positivity and normalization constraints for 2-input
2-output scenario lead the probability vector to lie in a
2 Reichenbach gave his principle a formal statement in Ref [46]. In the
light of Bell’s theorem it’s modification [47] tells that, if two physical
variables A and B are found to be statistically dependent the either:
(i) A and B are directly causally connected, i.e. either A causes B or
B causes A, or (ii) A and B share a common cause that explains the
correlation.
8 dimensional polytope PNS [48]. Probability distribu-
tions satisfying the local-realistic constraint (B3) forms
another polytope L which is a strict subset of PNS. L
has both trivial and nontrivial facets– trivial facets cor-
respond to the positivity constraints and the nontrivial
ones to Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (Bell-CHSH)
inequality [49]. The polytope PNS consists of 24 ex-
tremal points (vertices), where 16 of them are local de-
terministic points being the extremal points of L and
the rests 8 are nonlocal extremal points. The local boxes
can be written as,
Pα,β,γ,δ(oA, oB|xA, xB) =

1, if oA = αxA ⊕ β
and oB = γxB ⊕ δ,
0, otherwise,
(B4)
with α, β,γ, δ ∈ {0, 1}. The 16 pure strategies (glA, gmB ),
with l,m = 1, 2, 3, 4 described in the manuscript, actu-
ally correspond to these 16 local extremal points, i.e.,
the strategies are chosen according to these local determ-
inistic extremal probability distributions. The average
payoffs for these 16 pure strategies are calculated in
Table-IV. There are three pure strategy Nash equilib-
ria (g1A, g
1
B), (g
3
A, g
1
B), and (g
1
A, g
3
B) each average payoff〈vA〉 = (3 + η + ηζ)/16 for Alice and average payoff
〈vB〉 = (3 + η + ηζ)/16 for Bob. Since pure/mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium are also correlated equilib-
rium hence these are also the correlated equilibria.
Moreover any convex mixture of these equilibria are
again a correlated equilibria but the average payoffs for
both Alice and Bob takes the same values as in the pure
cases.
The advice can also be the nonlocal extremal points
given by,
Pα,β,γ(oA, oB|xA, xB) =

1/2, if oA ⊕ ob =
xAxB ⊕ αxA ⊕ βxB ⊕ γ
0, otherwise.
(B5)
with α, β,γ ∈ {0, 1}, or more generally any correlation
within PNS, that can be expressed as a 4× 4 matrix in
the following canonical form:
P(OA,OB|XA,XB) :=
c00 m0 − c00 n0 − c00 1−m0 − n0 + c00
c01 m0 − c01 n1 − c01 1−m0 − n1 + c01
c10 m1 − c10 n0 − c10 1−m1 − n0 + c10
c11 m1 − c11 n1 − c11 1−m1 − n1 + c11
 , (B6)
where (P(00|00), P(01|00), P(10|00), P(11|00)) ≡
(c00,m0 − c00, n0 − c00, 1 − m0 − n0 + c00) and so on.
Positivity constraint implies each element of the 4× 4
matrix lies in between 0 and 1.
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Figure 2. (Color online) θ0 vs η plot. The graph shows that
with increasing values of η the values of θ0 gets decreased.
The blue solid line is drawn for η taking values upto 20 and in
the inset we plot it for η upto 5000.
A correlation is known to be quantum one if it
has a quantum realization, i.e., P(oA, oB|xA, xB) =
Tr[ρAB(E
xA
oA ⊗ ExBoB )], where ρAB ∈ D(CdA ⊗ CdB) and
{ExAoA }, {ExBoB } represents some local POVM on Alice’s
and Bob’s side respectively. Collection of all quantum
correlations Q forms a convex set lying strictly in
between PNS and L, i.e., L ⊂ Q ⊂ PNS. Our main
interest is to study social welfare solution within the set
Q for the the game G(ζ, η).
Appendix C: Pure entanglement as quantum-sw solution
If the two players are advised by a correlation from
PNS the average payoff of each player turns out to be
〈vA(P)〉 = 116
[
3+
η
2
(BCHSH + 2ζm0) + (m0 − n0)
]
,
〈vB(P)〉 = 116
[
9+
η
2
(BCHSH + 2ζm0)−m0 + n0
]
.(C1)
A quantum strategy will serve as a quantum so-
cial welfare solution if δVi := 〈vi(P)〉 − 〈vi(g∗)〉 ≥
0 for i = {A, B} and 〈vA(P)〉 + 〈vB(P)〉 =
1
16 [12+ η (BCHSH + 2ζm0)] yields the maximum value
over Q.
The maximum value within Q of the term 〈vA(P)〉+
〈vB(P)〉 will be obtained when value of (BCHSH + 2ζm0)
i.e. the tilted Bell-CHSH inequality, is maximum over
Q. The above expression will reach maximum for
the quantum state |ψ〉AB = cos θ|00〉AB + sin θ|11〉AB
with the local projective measurement E(xA=0) =
σz, E(xA=1) = σx and E(xB=0) = cos βσz + sin βσx,
E(xB=1) = cos βσz − sin βσx; where tan β = sin 2θ and
ζ = 2/
√
1+ 2 tan2 2θ ∈ [0, 2). As a result m0 =
cos2 θ, n0 = 12
(
1+ cos(2θ)√
1+sin2(2θ)
)
and BCHSH = (3 −
cos 4θ)/
√
1+ sin2 2θ, which further imply,
〈vA(P)〉 = 116
[
3+
η
2
3− cos 4θ√
1+ sin2 2θ
+
2η cos2 θ√
1+ 2 tan2 2θ
+
1
2
cos 2θ
(
1− 1√
1+ sin2 2θ
)]
, (C2)
〈vB(P)〉 = 116
[
9+
η
2
3− cos 4θ√
1+ sin2 2θ
+
2η cos2 θ√
1+ 2 tan2 2θ
−1
2
cos 2θ
(
1− 1√
1+ sin2 2θ
)]
. (C3)
For the classical pure equilibrium strategies g∗ ≡
{(g1A, g1B), (g1A, g3B), (g3A, g1B)}, the corresponding pay-
offs are,
〈vA(g∗)〉 = 3+ η + ηζ16 =
1
16
(
3+ η +
2η√
1+ 2 tan2 2θ
)
,
(C4a)
〈vB(g∗)〉 = 9+ η + ηζ16 =
1
16
(
9+ η +
2η√
1+ 2 tan2 2θ
)
.
(C4b)
For a given η, let θ0 denotes the value of θ ∈ (0,pi/4]
beyond which δVB takes positive value. In Fig.2 we show
how the value of θ0 tends towards zero with increasing
values of η.
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